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Intergroup relations would be impossible without language.  Groups use language to form, 
organize, to attach and resist stigma, to conduct and to end conflicts with other groups.  
Nonetheless, in the study of intergroup relations, language has received much less attention than 
cognition
1
.  Probably, it has not always been clear to researchers how language is more than 
necessary for intergroup relations.  Of course, people need language to conduct intergroup 
relations, but they also need to breathe, eat, drink water, and many other things.  No-one would 
be satisfied with an explanation of an intergroup atrocity that invoked one of these merely 
necessary causes (e.g., “Oh, the problem was that everyone had drunk enough water”).   
In this chapter, we seek to examine whether language is more than a precondition for 
intergroup relations.  Is language a causal force in its own right, with the power to create and 
change intergroup dynamics?  If so, language must be able to affect, as well as reflect, the way 
that people think about groups. Thus, we review research that has been inspired by prevalent 
metaphors of the dynamic between language and cognition. First, language can be considered a 
vessel in which thoughts are encapsulated and transmitted from one mind to another. Second, 
language can be seen as a lens which focuses cognition on certain aspects of the world and away 
from others. Third, language can be seen as a barometer which reveals a communicator‟s 
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cognition to the audience. We discuss the implications of each of these language-cognition 
dynamics for intergroup relations.    
Language as a Vessel: Containing and Conveying Cognition 
Of the three metaphors we consider in this chapter, this is perhaps the most immediately 
recognizable, and has been dominant in the experimental study of language and intergroup 
relations (for reviews, see Fiedler, 2008; Maass, 1999; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). In this 
perspective, ideas about groups in the memory (M) of senders are transmitted through language 
(L) and implanted in the minds of recipients. In turn, recipients transmit these ideas to others, in 
M-L-M-L chains. Language is seen as essentially reproductive, in a process made possible by co-
operative use of mutually understood symbols according to mutually understood rules.  
 Of course, the simplest possible way in which language can transmit ideas about groups 
is for senders to explicitly assert them: “those people are lazy and aggressive” (Sutton, Elder, 
Douglas, & Tarrant, 2008). However, the bald assertion of stereotypes has its disadvantages, as 
we shall see, and is by no means the only way in which stereotypes may be transmitted. For 
example, it is possible to transmit stereotypes of a group without referring to it.  One can, 
instead, describe the behavior of individual group members in biased ways.   
The Serial Transmission Paradigm: Biases in what Behaviors are Described.   
One such bias is to describe more behaviors that are consistent, versus inconsistent, with 
stereotypes. Lyons and Kashima (2003) had participants relay a story which contained 
stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information about individual group members in serial 
communication chains.  These chains are rather like the children‟s game sometimes called 
“Chinese whispers”. As the original story is told to a recipient who in turn tells it to another 
recipient, and so on, it bears less and less resemblance to the original. Indeed, Lyons and 
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Kashima found that by the time the story had reached the end of the chains, much of the 
stereotype-inconsistent information had disappeared, while significantly more of the stereotype-
consistent information had survived.   
Crucially, Lyons and Kashima (2003) found that this bias was stronger when 
communicators were led to believe that the stereotype was widely shared in their community. It 
appears that people tend to reproduce stereotype-consistent information because they think it is 
consistent with a shared world view, or a common ground, and is therefore likely to be easily 
understood and accepted by recipients (Clark, 1996).  In contrast, information that is inconsistent 
with widely shared stereotypes is less likely to result in successful communication. Instead, 
communicators may anticipate receiving querulous, puzzled responses.   
This suggests that senders tacitly view their language as a vessel: a means to transmit 
information in the context of a shared set of assumptions about the world. Ironically, they 
therefore withhold pieces of stereotype-inconsistent information, fearing that these would disrupt 
transmission. Apparently, how people think about language affects how they use language. This 
reflexivity gives language the power to do much more than transmit thought.  The serial 
transmission paradigm illustrates why we can view cognition and language as “two sides of the 
same integral whole” (Fiedler, 2008, p. 45), capable of creating and modifying reality as well as 
reproducing it.   
The Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB): Biases in how Behaviors are Described.   
Whereas the study of serial transmission is concerned with biases in what behaviors are 
described, much research has been devoted to biases in how they are described. For example, a 
considerable body of research has examined how language may perpetuate and transmit 
prejudice in a process called the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB: Maass, 1999). Informed by the 
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linguistic category model (LCM: Semin & Fiedler, 1988), the LIB assumes that behavioral 
events can be described at different levels, ranging from concrete verbs such as “hit” or “kissed” 
to adjectives such as “violent” and “affectionate”.  As language becomes more abstract, it 
conveys less about the situational context and the specific form of the behavior, implies longer 
duration, and conveys more about the characteristics of the person whose actions are described.   
In the LIB, ingroup members‟ positive behaviors and outgroup members‟ negative 
behaviors are described in abstract terms, as if they reflected the underlying qualities of each 
group.  In contrast, ingroup members‟ negative and outgroup members‟ positive behaviors are 
described in concrete terms, as if they were isolated events quite unrelated to how group 
members would normally behave.  Therefore, even if an equal proportion of the positive and 
negative behaviors of each group were described, ingroup members‟ would be described more 
favorably. The LIB occurs in many intergroup contexts, in many countries, in several languages, 
and in naturally-occurring settings as well as the laboratory.  In part, the linguistic bias reflects 
the impact of stereotypical expectancies on the way people encode social information.  Having 
encoded a negative behavior abstractly, perhaps because of ingroup bias, people are more likely 
to describe it in those terms.    
The LIB is affected not just by how communicators have encoded events but also by their 
communication goals.  For example, the LIB is heightened when communicators perceive an 
outgroup to be threatening, apparently because they are motivated to derogate it whilst bolstering 
the ingroup (Maass, 1999).  Further research suggests that under some circumstances, 
communication goals may turn out to reverse the LIB. For example, given a temporary 
motivation to describe an enemy in positive terms, communicators will use abstract language to 
describe their positive behavior and concrete language to describe their negative behavior, 
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reversing the normal bias (for a review, see Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). Thus, the LIB can be 
used strategically by communicators in order to create impressions of ingroup and outgroup 
members that diverge from their own perceptions. Far from merely replicating biased mental 
representations (although this is in itself an extremely important function), the LIB may be used 
to create new ones.   
Facilitation and inhibition of behavior are regulated by different processes, as we see in 
the case of addiction.  As many smokers may attest, being able to light a cigarette when one 
chooses does not guarantee that one is able not to light up.  Similarly, communicators are able to 
use linguistic bias creatively but appear to have very limited power to inhibit bias when 
instructed to do so (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). As a result, even communicators with egalitarian 
intentions may be prone to the LIB, and so contribute to intergroup bias unwittingly (Maass, 
1999).  The LIB appears to be a force both for creation and inertia in relations between groups. 
Outside the Mind: Linking Biased Transmission to Intergroup Relations.   
Much of our social knowledge is based not on direct personal observation but on information 
that has been communicated to us, for example in gossip or though the mass media.  Thus, we 
rely on the vessel-like properties of language to faithfully convey information to us from people 
who have direct access to the facts.  However, language is not a perfect vessel, because its use 
not only transmits but also transforms information.  The transformation is directional rather than 
random, causing social information to converge upon prevailing stereotypes.   
Not only is social information transformed by communication processes; it is also 
externalized.  Every time we share information about ingroup and outgroup members, we place 
that information into the public sphere, where it can be received, remembered, and written down 
by others.  In this sense, the biases in language that we have documented cause people to 
Language, Cognition and Intergroup Relations                  6 
 
“upload” biased information into the public domain.  Following Durkheim (1912/2001), it is 
even possible to think of stereotypes and prejudice as being represented there, freed by language 
from the local and fleeting character of thought, but also enabled to influence the thoughts of 
many others (cf. Maass, 1999).     
In sum, language changes social information and transcribes it from psychological to 
social media.  Once made public, the information will impact on the psychological 
representations of many others.  This continual interplay is deeply social-psychological, because 
communicators transform information in light of the stereotypes that they believe to be shared in 
the community and the effects they think their statements will have on others. The dynamics are 
complex and recursive, but each part of the process has been demonstrated in the relatively 
simple experiments we have reviewed.  The A-causes-B structure of the social psychological 
experiment documents the operation of each cog in the machine.  Only a body of experiments, 
considered together, comprises a model of the whole machine, that is to say the process by which 
language, considered as a vessel for the transmission of information, shapes intergroup relations.  
Much the same thing is true of experiments that have been informed by our next metaphor.  
However the lens metaphor grants language a more obvious and immediate transformative 
power.   
Language as a Lens: Focusing and Directing Cognition 
This metaphor suggests that language has power – this has even been termed a “magic spell” 
(Stapel & Semin, 2007) – over cognition. This view of language was made famous by the 
anthropologist Benjamin Whorf (for a review see Fiedler, 2008).  Human beings live in 
enormously complex, continually changing environments.  In order to survive in such 
environments, they need to act in a co-ordinated, co-operative way. To do this, people need a 
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shared focus, when required, on a discrete subset of goal-relevant objects and events.  This is 
where language comes in.  Like a lens, it directs the joint focus of senders‟ and recipients‟ 
attention, thought, and memory.  In this sense, it constrains the reality that people experience. 
The focusing, lens-like power of language is often obvious, as in “there‟s a car coming”.   
At other times, however, it is more subtle.  The masculine generic is an example relevant to our 
purposes.  Here, linguistic convention in English has long had it that masculine terms such as 
“man”, “his”, and the collective noun “Man”, can be used without reference to gender.  Thus our 
examples are supposed to refer to “person”, “his or her”, and “Humanity”, respectively.  
Nonetheless, Ng (1990) showed that participants who had been presented with these masculine 
generic terms did not encode them in this gender-neutral way. Rather, a subsequent memory test 
showed that they had encoded the masculine generic as referring to men and not women. This 
result suggests that male individuals will tend to be seen as the ones who contribute 
“manpower”, who are responsible for the achievements of “Mankind”, and so on. 
Ng‟s (1990) findings are consistent with the lens rather than the vessel metaphor.  
Language is a vessel insofar as its symbols are used in accordance with rules of syntax and 
convention.  According to these rules, we should think of people of both genders when the 
masculine generic is used.  Nonetheless, we think of men.  Probably, the masculine generic 
effect occurs partly because words like “man” and “his” are often used to refer only to males, 
and so acquire an association with male referents that is carried over even into other contexts.  
Here is the power of the humble word to focus attention, memory and cognition, irrespective of 
the linguistic rules and conventions that are supposed to govern it.   
Relations between other groups are also affected by this lens-like power of the word. Of 
particular importance are the words that people use to denote groups. Of course, some of these 
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verbal labels are derogatory, as in “fag”, whereas others are neutral or positive, as in “gay” 
(Carnaghi & Maass, 2008).  In this respect, the labels are like vessels with which positive and 
negative attitudes to a group are communicated.   
As it turns out, the complexity of group labels is also very important (Leader, Mullen, & 
Rice, 2009; Mullen, Calogero, & Leader, 2007). Here, complexity is a property of a set of group 
labels, rather than any single group label. Each label indicates a particular means of categorizing 
the group – for instance according to its territory, language, or customs. A set of labels is simple 
if it tends to cluster within just one of these categories. It is complex if it is distributed across 
several categories, meaning that available group labels collectively indicate many facets of the 
group.   
To illustrate, the Bari of central Africa are denoted by a simple set of two labels, Bari and 
Bai. This set is simple because both labels mean the same thing, “the others”.  In contrast, the 
Herero of southwestern Africa are denoted by a more complex set of two labels: Herero, 
meaning “to brandish a spear”, and Dimba, which is “alluvial soil near a stream”.  This set is 
more complex because each label means something different and refers to different means of 
categorizing the group.  Herero refers to one of the group‟s behaviors, and Dimba refers to where 
they are from (Mullen et al., 2007).   
Across three archival studies in various ethnic settings, Mullen et al. (2007) studied how 
the complexity of these sets of labels affected intergroup relations.  Their focus was on 
ethnonyms -  the labels that a group used to describe itself.  They found that higher complexity of 
ethnonyms was associated with lower levels of intergroup hostility (e.g., the incidence of warfare 
and intergroup killing, as recorded in academic tracts or official public records).  In keeping with 
the lens metaphor, complex ethonyms draw attention to the ingroup‟s many facets. If an 
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ingroup‟s identity is multifaceted and complex, it is likely to be less susceptible to threat, and 
capable of supporting nuanced relations with other groups (Mullen et al., 2007).   
Extending this research, Leader et al. (2009) experimentally varied the complexity of the 
labels for an outgroup – all derogatory terms known as ethnophaulisms.  Participants exposed 
only to simple sets of labels subsequently indicated the desire to socially exclude outgroup 
members (e.g., by restricting immigration and intermarriage).  Those exposed to complex labels 
were more willing to include them. It is not yet clear what exactly drives this effect, but a 
reasonable guess is that simple sets of ethnophaulisms are consonant with a one-dimensional 
caricature of outgroup members.  In contrast, complex sets of labels call attention to their three-
dimensional, human character, making intergroup violence difficult to support or condone.   
Intergroup relations may also be affected by another phenomenon consistent with the lens 
metaphor, namely the saying-is-believing effect (e.g., Hausmann, Levine & Higgins, 2008). This 
effect occurs when the act of describing persons or group changes subsequent memory for them. 
For example, when you believe your audience does not like Group A, you are more likely to 
describe Group A in negative terms, and subsequently, to remember them more negatively. 
Impressively, the saying-is-believing effect tends to grow over time.  Attributing negative traits 
to a group creates, in memory, an association between the group and those traits. If you have just 
made the negative comments, you will remember them clearly and realize that they contribute to 
your negative feelings about the group. If you made the comments some weeks ago, you are less 
likely to recall exactly what you said and why. Thus the negative mental associations seem 
attributable to the group itself, rather than what you have said about it.   
The general point made by the saying-is-believing effect exemplifies the radical idea at 
the heart of the “lens” metaphor, and is crucial for understanding the language-cognition 
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interface: our language changes how we, as well as our audiences, think. These changes occur in 
parallel and indeed depend partly on each other, because the lens of language brings about a joint 
focus of attention, helping to create a reality that is shared by senders and receivers alike.  In 
keeping with this idea, the saying-is-believing effect seems to work better when communicators 
believe their description has reached an audience, and to work best when the audience is ingroup 
(for reviews see Fiedler, 2008; Hausmann et al., 2008; Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008).  
Language as a Barometer: Revealing Cognitions 
In this metaphor, the reflexive nature of the relationship between language and cognition comes 
to the fore.  Language is now the object of cognition, serving as a cue that may reveal its users‟ 
thoughts, memories, and motives. For example, communicators who use hate terms such as “fag” 
signal that they are prejudiced (Carnaghi & Maass, 2008). Similarly, people who make explicit , 
negative statements about a group (e.g., “the British are  a nation of binge drinkers”) are likely to 
be seen to have malign intentions, especially if they do not belong to the group concerned (e.g., 
Sutton, Elder, & Douglas, 2006). If communicators use abstract language to describe a person‟s 
negative behavior and concrete language for their positive behavior, they are also seen as having 
negative attitudes and intentions (Douglas & Sutton, 2006: although it is not yet known whether 
this finding extends to cases in which groups, rather than people, are the topic of conversation).   
These examples are grounds for hope that because it is a barometer, language can be 
employed in the fight against prejudice. Social authorities and motivated individuals can 
challenge, convert or sanction those who reveal their prejudices with language. Thus the 
linguistic barometer can be an invaluable aid in establishing and enforcing anti-prejudice norms. 
Further, motivated individuals may also refer to these norms in order to prevent using language 
that contributes to prejudice. For example, Sutton et al. (2006, Study 3) found that individuals 
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were less willing to criticize outgroups than their own group. This was strongly related to the 
perception that criticism of outgroups is normatively unacceptable. It seems that people evaluate 
the potentially prejudiced things they might say, and perhaps anticipate how others would 
evaluate them.  Hence they are more likely to show restraint.   
That said, the barometric property of language is not all good news. For one thing, when 
people think that prejudice toward a group is normative, they may be encouraged to use hate 
terms, so winning kudos for adherence to the norm. Conversely, people may infer that prejudice 
is normative when they hear others using hate terms. In such cases, the barometer plays a vital 
role in a self-perpetuating cycle of prejudice. Similarly, members of groups that find themselves 
overtly criticized tend to view the criticism as a slur, a sign of prejudice.  In research I am 
currently doing with colleagues, we are finding that this reading of criticism causes people to 
adopt a besieged, rather jingoistic form of attachment to their group that predisposes them to 
prejudice and intergroup hostility
2
.   
Further, the barometric property of language can fuel adverse intergroup relations by 
changing the dynamics of self-presentation. For example, there is a stereotype in Western nations 
that compared to men, women are more fearful of crime.  A woman who says that “I‟m not 
afraid of crime” therefore risks the backlash that often accompanies violations of stereotypical 
expectancies. Fear of this backlash may cause women to express high levels of fear that do not 
necessarily reflect their private experience.  In this way, a normative climate of fear becomes 
self-fulfilling. Women are controlled not only by the fear of crime, but the belief that they 
generally are, and should be, fearful. In this schema, the fear of crime is not only an “instrument” 
but also a “yardstick” of social control (Sutton & Farrall, 2008).    
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 More pitfalls stem from the limitations of language as a barometer. Prejudiced attitudes 
are transmitted, but not reliably signified, by certain types of language use. The LIB and the 
selective transmission effects we have reviewed are examples of unwitting, covert, or implicit 
forms of transmission that are likely to go unnoticed. Because they are not noticed, they are 
unlikely to trigger appropriate responses. Instead, efforts are bound to center on aspects of their 
language that are obviously linked to prejudice, such as explicit criticisms of a group or the 
blatant use of hate terms. While the elimination of this type of language is strongly desirable and 
likely to benefit intergroup relations in many ways, a potential downside is that becomes harder 
to identify and sanction those who are prejudiced. It may also be difficult to challenge ideologies 
that advocate prejudice and conflict when they are seldom voiced explicitly.   
In contrast, implicit, gradual, and difficult to control biases are difficult for people to 
“read” barometrically, so may be left to degrade intergroup relations in their quiet way.  As a 
result, minority groups may find themselves excluded from employment and many other 
opportunities, even though no-one goes on record with overtly prejudiced statements about them.  
Majority groups may be inclined to infer from the lack of blatantly prejudicial language in their 
community that prejudice is absent, and so resist attempts to counteract it.   
The flawed use of language as a barometer may lead to a paradox of liberalism (Sutton et 
al., 2008).  Here, debate about prejudice and other overt modes of discourse with great diagnostic 
and transformative potential are all but eliminated from the public sphere.  What remains are the 
insidious modes of communication that are better equipped to help prejudice grow and thrive 
than to stop it. Whether these really are perverse side-effects of the liberal agenda to reform 
intergroup language is a difficult empirical question which has not yet been fully answered, even 
if the scenario just outlined seems familiar (see also Leets & Giles, 1997).   
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Conclusion 
We have seen that language does not merely reflect but also affects cognition, and that in its 
interplay with cognition language creates, as well as replicates, social information.   One source 
of the creative power of language is the reflexivity of its use. That is, people‟s  beliefs about 
language modify how they use it, and how they react to the language used by others. This causes 
them to transform information even as they attempt to transmit it. Another source of the power of 
language is the ability of words – its fundamental units – to direct and modify cognition 
independently of the rules that are supposed to govern their use. Further, language also has the 
potential to worsen or improve intergroup relations by acting as a barometric indicator of 
prejudice. When entrusted to interactions between reflexive, strategic, and promiscuously 
associative human minds, language seems unable to transmit information faithfully or to obey its 
own rules.  Ironically, the imperfection of language grants it tremendous creative power.   
   Given that language has received relatively little attention in the study of intergroup 
relations, further research is likely to reveal that it has more tricks up its sleeve. For example, it 
is striking that no published empirical study has shown directly that stereotypes themselves are 
changed by the LIB or by the selective transmission bias. Dependent measures usually concern 
what is transmitted (e.g., Lyons & Kashima, 2003), or judgments about the individual group 
members whose behavior is described (see Maass, 1999). No study has taken explicit 
endorsement of a stereotype of a group as the dependent measure. This should be a priority for 
future research, and suggests a more general question: does language affects intergroup relations 
principally by altering beliefs about groups, or by other means? 
 In this vein, biases like the LIB may worsen intergroup relations in everyday life by 
biasing attention, rather than cumulatively changing the representation of groups. For example, 
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by using abstract language for outgroup members‟ negative behavior, the communicator focuses 
attention on the traits and motivations that may have brought the behavior about. In contrast, by 
using concrete language for ingroup members‟ negative behavior, the communicator instead 
draws attention to situational forces which tend to exonerate the actor. Implicitly, joint attention 
and therefore joint action is focused on the outrages that are willfully and characteristically 
committed by outgroup members, but not ingroup members. This may lead to biases in punitive, 
vengeful, or group-protective behaviors.  Here then is another priority for further research.   
 These questions highlight the ability of language to operate simultaneously in more than 
one mode – as both vessel and lens, in this case. Indeed this is probably how language normally 
functions: a verbal statement about a topic simultaneously conveys information about a topic 
(like a vessel), focuses attention on it (like a lens), and also betrays information about the 
communicator (like a barometer). Thinking about the multiple functions of language opens up a 
range of important research questions, some of which we have already touched on. For example, 
can people infer from the group labels used by others whether prejudice and hostility toward 
outgroups are normative within their group?  Similarly, can they detect whether an LIB is 
operating in their community and from that, infer whether prejudice is normative (cf. Douglas & 
Sutton, 2006; Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008)? 
Considering the multiple functions of language also enables researchers to import 
insights from one line of research into another. To illustrate, the “vessel” metaphor tends to cast 
language as something that happens after cognition: beliefs about the topic and the 
communicative context shape the way that people transmit information. In contrast, the lens 
metaphor casts language as something that precedes cognition – the idiomatic availability of 
group labels constrains the way that people can think about groups. The different temporal orders 
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implied by the vessel and lens metaphors have shaped research on topics such as the LIB and 
group labels respectively, and it is possible to turn them on their heads. For example, researchers 
have already shown that audiences‟ responses to outgroups are improved by exposure to 
complex labels (Leader et al., 2009).  Extrapolating backwards from this work, one can predict 
that individuals who mentally represent an outgroup in three-dimensional, sympathetic terms are 
more likely to use a complex set of labels when referring to it. In turn, those exposed to their 
language should be favorably influenced by it.  If this works out, we would have an example of a 
transition from an “open loop”, where language affects cognition, to a “closed loop” model, 
where language affects cognition, which in turn affects language, in a recurring and enduring 
social-psychological dynamic.  
This kind of transition is crucial to understanding the interplay between fleeting, situated 
micro-social processes and broader, more enduring features of the macro-social environment. 
More generally, we should not overlook the essential function of the day-to-day use of language 
for the survival of culture and society. There is an intuitive tendency to essentialize the social 
and cultural “status quo”, to think of it as an entity that survives de facto. But in fact the status 
quo depends on perpetual enactment and renewal. Cultural ideas are continually passed on by the 
vessel of language. Objects and events of shared interest in the world are continually selected by 
the lens of language. The ideologies and values that hold us together are continually signaled by 
the barometer of language. If we were to use language in fundamentally different ways 
tomorrow, then our culture, society, and intergroup relations would be fundamentally different 
(Kashima, 2001). Thus, whether intergroup relations stay the same or change, we should look to 
the dynamic between language and cognition for an explanation. In this respect, language is not 
just at the heart, but is the beating heart, of intergroup relations.   
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